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Abstract 
This paper analyzes inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using 
the citizen-candidate model. It focuses on conflicting interests among regions and 
among citizens of varying mobility. If discrimination with respect to place of residence 
and degree of mobility is possible, diversity of interests is high. Under the plurality rule 
and with sincere voting, the largest socioeconomic group of citizens supplies the win-
ning candidate and discriminates against all other groups. However, if discrimination 
with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained, mobile citizens may gain power 
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1  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze interregional redistribution (and its accompanying 
intraregional redistribution) within a simple politico-economic model. There is a large 
body of literature on the impact of mobility on redistribution in a federation (see, e.g., 
Wildasin, 1991; Hindriks, 1999), but such is not the subject of this paper. Here, a unita-
ry state, comprised of several well-defined regions, having a centralized political system 
is considered. Even in a unitary state, the central government is able to redistribute 
between regions in several ways: varying levels of public good supply, discriminatory 
taxation, and via transfers to households or firms. These instruments may be considered 
as a substitute for intergovernmental grants. All (sufficiently large) countries in the 
world, irrespective of whether they are federations or unitary states, redistribute be-
tween regions (for interregional redistribution in unitary and federal states, see, e.g., 
Shankar and Shah, 2003). 
The direction and size of interregional redistribution is subject to political deci-
sion making (for an overview, see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). The theoretical litera-
ture on distributive policy suggests that minimum winning coalitions determine the 
outcome in the legislature (see the seminal work by Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Rik-
er, 1962). An obvious conjecture is that the majority adopts policies that benefit itself at 
the expense of the minority. Since empirical studies report that minorities are not com-
pletely excluded from the benefits of distributive legislation, the idea of a more univer-
salistic legislation that offers insurance against the risk of expropriation has been sug-
gested (see Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). However, even under a 
universalistic approach, a centrally determined policy need not be uniform per se (for a 
recent analysis of this issue, see Besley and Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2002). Further-
more, a restriction to uniformity increases the welfare of citizens, since it reduces the 
opportunity for playing some voting districts off against others (Wrede, 2006).  
To analyze redistribution between regions in a unitary state, this paper employs 
the citizen-candidate model (see Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). 
The basic assumption of the citizen-candidate model is that candidates cannot commit - 2 - 
to particular policies (e.g., because voters are unable to coordinate themselves to a strict 
backward-looking voting procedure). The winning candidate adopts policies that max-
imize his or her utility. If policies cannot discriminate on an individual basis, policy 
variables are chosen so as to maximize the utility of the candidate’s peers. Depending 
on the voting procedure, the strategic behavior of voters, and the diversity of interests, 
the winning candidate may be a member of a small socioeconomic group of citizens. As 
a consequence, a large majority of voters and regions may be subject to (negative) 
discrimination. Within the framework of the citizen-candidate model, it will be shown 
that anyone who is not a member of the political leader’s socioeconomic group is sub-
ject to severe discrimination (if voting is sincere and if the plurality rule is applied). 
Regions may be expropriated. A somewhat universalistic legislation is indeed required 
to overcome this dilemma. 
The citizen-candidate model is employed by Lorz and Nastassine (2007) to ana-
lyze the impact of interjurisdictional mobility on regional policy. However, they do not 
consider mobility within the jurisdiction; instead showing that an increase in mobility 
across borders can be responsible for shifting the policy outcome toward the preferred 
policy of the less mobile citizens in a certain region, since it reduces the incentives for 
candidacy. 
Although this paper specifically considers individual candidates competing for 
the presidency, the model as a whole can be regarded as a stylized representation of 
competition between parties representing mobile or immobile citizens. Therefore, both 
presidential and parliamentary systems are covered by the paper. 
  The focus of this paper is on the varying interests of mobile and immobile citi-
zens. Citizens who are completely attached to one particular region truly benefit from 
considerable redistribution toward their region, but mobile citizens may be negatively 
affected from thus implied stream of migration. The paper shows that the likelihood of 
the political leader being a mobile citizen increases, and interregional redistribution is 
therefore reduced, if legislation is more universalistic in the sense that discrimination 
with respect to the degree of mobility is excluded. Simply because the degree of mobili-- 3 - 
ty is not a verifiable property, in reality the tax legislator’s ability to discriminate expli-
citly with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained. The analysis reveals that 
under a nondiscrimination rule, expropriation of regions is no longer a likely outcome 
of the political process, since the political leader is typically mobile and not attached to 
a particular region (provided that political leaders do indeed maximize the welfare of 
the socioeconomic group they belong to). This result seems an accurate reflection of 
real-world politics. There is at least some anecdotal evidence that candidates who are 
strongly attached to a particular region are less successful in federal elections. For 
example, in Germany, the partially autonomous Bavarian section of the right-wing party 
has never been able to supply a winning candidate for the chancellorship. Furthermore, 
in the United States, although during the 20th century several state governors won the 
presidency, very few Senate members had that success. Both governors and senators 
require a local majority, but the latter lack administrative experience and are more 
involved in pork barrel policies at the federal level. In some federations, even a state 
governor post, for example, the position of “Landeshauptmann” in Austria, seems not to 
be qualification enough for the top job at the federal level, a phenomenon that may be 
attributed to the regional attachment of governors. 
The paper shows that a nondiscrimination rule strengthens mobile candidates 
and thus reduces interregional redistribution. From an ex-ante perspective, immobile 
citizens might even benefit from a ban on discrimination, although it reduces the pros-
pects of their candidates in a national election. A result of wider application is that since 
citizens representing special interests have a strategic disadvantage compared to candi-
dates representing common interests, nondiscrimination rules that prevent certain 
groups from pursuing their interests at the expense of others, decrease the special inter-
est groups’ electoral prospects and, in the long run, are of benefit to the society as a 
whole. This result could apply to various types of special interests groups—regional, 
sectoral, or cohort based. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the economic framework 
and then the political part of the model is presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 ana-- 4 - 
lyze equilibria of the complete game in the absence and presence of a nondiscrimination 
rule. Section 6 concludes and discusses some shortcomings and possible extensions of 
the model. 
2  The basic economic model 
The model is comprised of a unitary state that consists of n regions. Total population is 
divided into n + 1 groups: members of the first group with (strictly positive) size N are 
perfectly mobile across regions, all other groups are completely immobile. From mobile 
group’s perspective, all regions are identical. In contrast, each of the immobile groups, 
with size  i L , is completely attached to a particular region, with  L L
n
1 i i = ∑ = . Without 
loss of generality, it is assumed that  n 2 1 L L L ≥ ≥ ≥ L . To rule out trivial solutions, 
L N L L
n
2 i i 1 < < −∑ =  is also assumed, that is, the largest single group of society mem-
bers does not form a majority in the state as a whole. 
  In region i, a private consumption good is produced according to a linearly 
homogeneous production function by both mobile and immobile workers, who are 
treated as imperfect substitutes:  ( ) i i L , N F , where  i N  is the number of mobile workers 
who work and live in region i, with  0 Ni ≥ . Mobile and immobile workers are com-
plementary:  0 F
i
NL > .
1 Furthermore,  ( ) ∞ = L , 0 FN  is assumed. By a simple linear tech-
nology, the private good can be transformed in a national public good G, G ≥ 0. The 
marginal rate of transformation is normalized to one. 
  Private consumption is paid for out of labor income minus income taxes. Income 
taxes may discriminate between types of individuals and/or regions. Discriminatory 
income taxation could be seen as a stylized representation of both differentiated taxation 
of varying sources of income and tax allowances that are targeted at certain groups. 
Hence, the budget constraints of mobile and immobile workers are 
























t 1 x ,  n , , 1 i K = , 
                                                 
1   Note that a prime indicates a derivative, a subscript denotes a partial derivative, and superscripts are 
indicative of particular regions. - 5 - 
respectively, with private consumption  0 x
N
i ≥  and  0 x
L
i ≥ , i =1, …, n. 
j
i t  is the in-
come tax levied on an individual of type j in region i. Workers derive utility from pri-
vate and public goods. Preferences are quasi-linear and identical across groups. The 
utility function is  () G v x u
j
i + = , where  0 v > ′ ,  0 v < ′ ′ , and  () ∞ = ′ → G v lim 0 G . The 
government budget constraint is  













i L F t N F t G .  
Income taxes may be positive or negative, but are not allowed to exceed unity: 
1 t
j
i ≤ , i = 1, …, n, j = N, L. Mobile workers choose their residence so as to maximize 
utility. At an interior migration equilibrium, ensured by the Inada-condition and the 
upper bound on tax rates, utility is equalized across regions. Hence, the migration equi-
librium is characterized by equalization of private consumption: 
(3)  ( ) () ρ = − i i N
N
i L , N F t 1 , n , , 1 i K = , 






where ρ is the common marginal product of mobile labor net of taxes. Therefore, tax 




i F 1 t ρ − = .  
3  Elections and government  
The government decides on tax rates and, as a consequence, the public good. The out-
come depends on the government’s objective function and, therefore, on the nature of 
the decision maker. The power of voters and the properties of the election procedure 
influence the government’s objective and opportunities. The following analysis applies 
the citizen-candidate model. The structure of the game is as follows: (1) each citizen 
decides whether or not to run for election; (2) in a common election, voters elect one 
candidate according to the plurality rule; (3) once elected, the winner determines tax 
rates and (implicitly) the public good; and (4) mobile workers choose residences, pro-
duction, and engage in consumption. - 6 - 
A main feature of the citizen-candidate model is that candidates cannot commit 
to particular policies. Hence, at the policy stage, the winning candidate chooses policy 
variables that will maximize his or her utility. In this model, it is assumed that the gov-
ernment is not concerned with reelection and that voters are unable to coordinate them-
selves to a strict backward-looking voting procedure. At the second stage, under the 
plurality rule, the candidate who receives the most votes wins the election. If the votes 
are tied, all candidates with the highest voting share win with the same probability. 
Deterministic and sincere voting without abstention is assumed. Each citizen votes for 
the one candidate whose decisions will maximize his or her utility. If a voter is indiffe-
rent between two candidates, he or she votes for a candidate of his or her own type. If 
this does not solve the indeterminacy, he or she tosses a coin. At the first stage, it is 
assumed that candidates are purely policy oriented. Candidacy costs and incumbency 
rents are ignored. A citizen runs for election if and only if his or her candidacy increases 
expected utility; otherwise he or she withdraws. If no citizen runs for election, no elec-
tion takes place, and tax rates and public good provision are set equal to zero. 
  An equilibrium of the game is a sequence of feasible decisions made at all stages 
of the game where each individual is forward looking and maximizing his or her utility 
whenever a decision has to be made. 
  Since there are n + 1 types of citizens, there are n + 1 types of possible candi-
dates. At the equilibrium, at most one citizen per type runs for election. If there were 
more than one candidate of the same type, the withdrawal of one of those candidates 
either would not affect the policy outcome or would increase the number of votes for 
the remaining candidates of that type and, therefore, increase the probability of winning 
the election. Furthermore, the winning probability of each candidate must be strictly 
positive; otherwise, the citizen would not run for election. Finally, since 
() ∞ = ′ → G v lim 0 G  is assumed, an equilibrium without any candidate cannot exist. Each 
citizen would benefit from running for election if there were no actual candidate. 
Solutions of the game are determined by backward induction. The final stage is 
especially characterized by the migration equilibrium determined by condition (3). The - 7 - 
following analysis of the policy stage will distinguish whether the government is al-
lowed (and able) to discriminate between mobile and immobile taxpayers.  
4  Policy under (almost) perfect discrimination  
To determine the equilibrium at the policy stage, the preferred policies of mobile and 
immobile workers need to be analyzed. The politician maximizes his or her utility 
subject to the government budget constraint, the labor market equilibrium condition, 
and non-negativity conditions by the choice of tax rates and public good supply. To 
simplify the derivation of optimum policies, an equivalent optimization problem is 
considered where the distribution of mobile workers and the common marginal product 
of labor net of taxes are control variables instead of mobile worker’s income tax rates 
and public good supply. Since all mobile workers achieve one and the same utility, the 
policy of a mobile worker politician can be described as the solution of 
(4)  () G v u max
N
t , , t





n 1 + ρ =
ρ
K
K  s.t. (2), (3),  0 x
N
k ≥ , and  0 x
L
k ≥ , k = 1, …, n. 
On the basis of the first-order conditions, the following lemma describes the resultant 
policy:
2 
Lemma 1: The policy choices of a mobile-citizen-led government (PM), are characte-
rized by  
(5) 0 x
L
k = ,  N
k
N F F = , n , , 1 k K = , and  1 v N = ′ .   # 
Proof: After inserting for G and 
N
k t , the first-order conditions of a mobile-citizen-led 
government are  
                                                 
2   Here and in the following it is assumed that output is large enough to ensure an interior solution with 
respect to public good supply. - 8 - 
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L = ′ , n , , 1 k K = . 
From (6.c) follows  1 t
L
k =  and  0 x
L
k =  for all k. Equation (6.a) implies  1 v N = ′ . Using 
1 t
L
k = ,  ∑ ≠ − =
n j j n N N N , and the properties of linearly homogeneous functions, from 




N F F = , for all k.  QED 
A federal government controlled by a mobile worker will completely exploit immobile 
workers.
3 The tax base is totally inelastic, since immobile workers cannot avoid taxes. 
A mobile-worker-dominated federal government supplies public goods without refer-
ence to immobile workers’ marginal willingness to pay for them. The sum of marginal 
rates of substitution of mobile workers is equalized with the marginal rate of transfor-
mation. The Samuelson condition is violated and the equilibrium is inefficient. Since 
the government redistributes total output to mobile workers without efficiency losses, it 
maximizes output by equalizing taxes rates applied to mobile workers’ income and, 
therefore, the marginal products of mobile labor across regions. The distribution of 
mobile workers is efficient. At equilibrium, taxes on mobile workers may very well be 
negative. 
  An immobile politician living in region i has different policy preferences. This 
type of politician solves 






t , , t





n 1 + − =
ρ
K
K  s.t. (2), (3),  0 x
N
k ≥ , 0 x
L
k ≥ , k = 1, …, n. 
The following lemma gives the solution: 
                                                 
3   The results do not change qualitatively if some common upper bound on tax rates is introduced that is 
sufficiently close to unity:  1 t t
j
i < ≤ , i = 1, …, n, j = L, N. - 9 - 
Lemma 2: The policy choices of a government led by an immobile resident of region i 
(PIi) are characterized by 
(8)  0 x
L
j = , j ≠ i,  0 x
N
k = ,  N
k
N F F = , n , , 1 k K = , and  1 v Li = ′ . # 
Proof: Assuming without loss of generality i ≠ n, using  ∑ ≠ − =
n j j n N N N , and insert-
ing for G and 
N
k t , the first-order conditions of a government under control of an immo-
bile resident of region i can be written as  
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= − − − + + ′ =
∂
∂
, j ≠ i, 
(9.e)  0 N v
u
Li
≤ ′ − =
ρ ∂
∂
 and () 0 N v = ρ ′ − . 
From Equation (9.a) follows  1 v Li = ′ . Condition (9.b) leads to  1 t
L
j =  and  0 x
L
j =  (j ≠ 
i). Inserting  1 t
L




N F F = . From (9.e) follows  0 = ρ  and, thus, 
1 t
N




N F F = . QED 
Immobile citizens from regions other than the politician’s own region are completely 
exploited. Furthermore, the government also expropriates mobile workers. With respect 
to the public good, because the immobile politician of region i is not concerned with the 
willingness to pay of mobile workers or with that of immobile workers in other regions, 
the public good supply is inefficient. 
  To determine the equilibrium at the policy stage, citizens’ policy choice prefe-
rences need to be determined. Policy choice preferences are indicated by  M f  for mobile 
workers and by  Ii f  for immobile residents of region i,  n , , 1 i K = . Obviously, mobile 
workers and immobile residents of region i (at least weakly) will prefer the program of - 10 - 
the candidate who lives in their region (because it is designed to maximize their utility) 
above the policies of any other candidates and will therefore vote (if possible) for that 
candidate:
4  Ii M M P P f  and  M Ii Ii P P f . Irrespective of whether a mobile citizen or an 
immobile resident of some region j rules the country, the private consumption of immo-
bile citizens in region i equals zero. Hence, whether immobile citizens prefer a governor 
of the mobile type to a governor who will maximize the utility of immobile residents of 
another region depends on public good supply and, therefore, on the size of those 
groups of citizens: if  j L N > ,  Ij Ii M P P f  (j ≠ i); however, if  j L N < ,  M Ii Ij P P f . By 
similar reasoning, it can be concluded that  Ij M Ii P P f  if  j i L L > . 
  It was argued above that at least one candidate has to appear at the equilibrium 
and that at most one candidate of each of the n + 1 groups (mobile workers and immo-
bile residents of the various regions) runs for election. The next proposition further 
describes the equilibria.  
Proposition 1: (a) If one group of citizens is larger than each other individual group, the 
unique equilibrium at the policy stage is a one-candidate equilibrium where the success-
ful candidate is a member of this group. (b) If each of m groups of equal size is larger 
than any other group of citizens, the unique equilibrium at the policy stage is a m-
candidate equilibrium with one candidate from each of the m largest groups.  # 
Proof: (a) First, a one-candidate election with a candidate from the largest group of 
voters is an equilibrium, since no citizen can win against this candidate. Second, there 
can be no equilibrium without a candidate from the largest group, since otherwise a 
citizen of this larger group will run for election and win. Third, an equilibrium where 
members of the largest and other groups simultaneously run for election cannot exist, 
since the winning probability of the latter is zero. (b) First, no citizen can win against 
these candidates. Second, there can be no equilibrium without one candidate from each 
of the largest groups, since a citizen from the unrepresented group would run for elec-
tion and win with positive probability. Third, an equilibrium with candidates from 
                                                 
4   Here and in the following the strong preference symbol is used even if programs are identical, as long 
as the citizen would vote for the “preferred” program. - 11 - 
groups of different size cannot exist, since candidates of the smaller groups have no 
chance of winning.  QED 
Thus the largest groups of citizens supply the political leader, who will then discrimi-
nate against all other citizen groups. 
  If discrimination between districts is prohibited by the constitution, only two 
strategy variables remain: the income tax rate for mobile citizens and the income tax 
rate for immobile citizens. Since, on the one hand, the political leader still completely 
expropriates all citizens of a type other than his or her own and, on the other hand, the 
degree to which the public good is underprovided decreases as the group of supporters 
increases, an immobile voter will win the election as long immobile workers are in the 
majority. However, as this scenario is not very reflective of the real-world situation, 
which is characterized by substantial interregional distribution, it is of only theoretical 
interest. Therefore, in the following section, a different limitation of the policy space is 
analyzed. 
5  Policy under constrained discrimination  
This section investigates taxation and election when governments cannot discriminate 
between mobile and immobile citizens. The attitude toward mobility is either not ob-
servable or not verifiable; alternatively, a constitutional rule against discrimination 
could be assumed. Hence, the government budget constraint (2) can be written as 
(10)  ∑ ∑

















1 F t G .  
A mobile citizen solves 
(11)  () G v u max
N
, , N , , N n 1 + ρ =
ρ K  s.t. (2), (3),  0 x
N
k ≥ , and  0 x
L
k ≥ , k = 1, …, n, 




k t t t = = ,  n , , 1 k K = . - 12 - 
The following lemma describes the solution:
5 
Lemma 3: The policy choices of a mobile-citizen-led government under a nondiscrimi-
nation rule (
ND





k = ′ ∑ = . 
Furthermore, t t k =  and  N
k
N F F = , for  n , , 1 k K = . # 
Proof: Using  ∑ ≠ − =
n j j n N N N , the first-order conditions of a mobile-citizen-led 
government are 




















































ρ − − ρ + =
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, n , , 1 k K = . 





k = ′ ∑ = . Equation (12.b) is fulfilled for all k if 




N F F = .   QED 
A government controlled by a mobile citizen will ensure production efficiency, but it 





N F F = , for all regions, public good supply would be efficient. The intuition 
is simple: Multiplying the public-good condition on both sides by ρ and rearranging, it 
becomes clear that the government taxes income as to ensure that the marginal utility 
v′ of the public good is equal to the mobile politician’s share in total net income 





k F F . Income taxation and public good supply are used as means of income 
redistribution. In an equal society where all citizens earn the same income before taxes, 
no redistribution takes place and the public good is, therefore, supplied efficiently.  
  Under the nondiscrimination rule, an immobile politician of region i solves 







, , N , , N n 1 + ρ =
ρ K  s.t. (2), (3),  0 x
N
k ≥ , and  0 x
L





k t t t = = ,  n , , 1 k K = . 
                                                 
5   It will be assumed that second-order conditions hold. By means of simulations it could be easily 
shown that this is indeed the case for Cobb-Douglas production technology and log utility of public - 13 - 
The following lemma characterizes the solution
6: 
Lemma 4: The policy choices of a government led by an immobile resident of region i 
(
ND









k F F v F F = ′ ∑ = . 
Furthermore,  i j t t − = , for all j ≠ i, and  i i t t − < .  
Hence,  n n j j i i L N L N L N = > , for all j ≠ i.  # 
Proof: Again using  ∑ ≠ − =
n j j n N N N , the first-order conditions of a government 
controlled by an immobile resident of region i can be written as 
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k F F v F F = ′ ∑ = . Equation (14.b) is fulfilled for all j ≠ i 




N F F = . Since the first term on the left-hand 
side of Equation (14.c) is clearly positive, the uniform tax rate  i t−  outside region i 
implies together with Equation (14.c)  i i t t − <  and, thus,  n n j j i i L N L N L N = > , for 
all j ≠ i.   QED 
An immobile citizen uses “tax rate differentiation” to discriminate against immobile 
residents of other regions. To attract mobile workers to his or her region, the govern-
ment unambiguously taxes foreign regions at a higher rate:  i i t t − < . This tax policy will 
clearly result in an inefficient distribution of mobile workers. Output is no longer max-
imized, but within the subset of regions other than region i production efficiency is 
restored. The ratio of mobile to immobile workers and, therefore, immobile workers’ 




L F F > .  
                                                                                                                                               
goods for a wide range of parameters. 
6   Without loss of generality i ≠ n is assumed. - 14 - 
Furthermore, an immobile-citizen led government and the mobile-citizen led 
government supply different quantities of the public good. Depending on the income 
distribution, the immobile resident may prefer either a larger or a smaller amount than  
the mobile citizen. If the immobile resident of region i is able to grab a large net income 








L F F F F , the public good is supplied in small quantity. To fur-
ther compare both regimes, the following exercise is helpful. Provided that the mobile 
workers’ intensity is the same in all regions other than region i, the following condition 
holds: 
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At  n ni = , this term is simply zero. Thus, a small distortion of mobile workers’ choices 
per se does not affect the denominator of the term that determines the public good 








L F F F F . However, an immobile resident whose productivity is 
quite low will nevertheless fix the income tax rate at a rather high level and will provide 
a large amount of the public good.  
  When it comes to a comparison of the two political programs, mobile citizens 
and immobile residents of region i obviously still prefer the program of the candidate of 
their own type (which is designed to maximize their utility) to that of any other candi-








Ii P P f . Preferences 
of immobile residents from other regions may go in either direction as there is a tradeoff 
between, on the one hand, inefficiency and distortion towards the immobile candidate’s 
home region and, on the other hand, a possibly higher public good supply. Hence, a 




M P P f , is a possible outcome, but not 
the only one. Since at this level of abstraction a preference for the immobile candidate 
of a different region cannot be ruled out, I carried out simulations with Cobb-Douglas-- 15 - 
Technology and log-utility of public good (for some results, see the Appendix). These 
simulations strongly support an intuitively appealing preference of immobile bystanders 
for the mobile candidate: Horizontal tax rate discrimination not only strongly hurts the 
negatively affected region, but may also be accompanied by lower public good supply. 
In accordance with these simulations, dominant countervailing public budget effects are 





M P P f , for all j, i, with j ≠ i. 
Using this assumption, the main result of the paper, set out in the following proposition, 
can be derived. 
Proposition 2: (a) Irrespective of the number of mobile citizens, a one-candidate equi-
librium where the successful candidate is a mobile citizen exists. (b) If N > L1, this 
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.  # 
Proof: (a) If only one immobile resident of region i enters the election game at this 
equilibrium, the mobile worker will still win the election, since mobile citizens and 
immobile residents of all regions other than region i vote for the mobile citizen pro-
gram. (b) Immobile citizens cannot win against a mobile citizen. There is no equili-
brium without a mobile-worker candidate, since otherwise a citizen of this type will run 
for election and win.  QED 
Although it is possible that no mobile citizen runs for election, the one-candidate equi-
librium with a mobile citizen becomes, in a sense, the predominant equilibrium, since it 
always exists. However, other equilibria may also exist, as is shown in the next proposi-
tion, which focuses on the symmetric case: L := Ln = L1. 
Proposition 3: If N  < L, (a) a n-candidate equilibrium exists with one immobile-
resident candidate from each region, and (b) no other equilibrium where immobile 
citizens run for election exists.   # 
Proof: (a) Because of N < L, a mobile citizen would not win against immobile residents 
without the support of other immobile individuals. However, if there is an immobile 
candidate from each region, the mobile candidate will not receive any support from - 16 - 
immobile residents. (b) There is no equilibrium where simultaneously mobile and im-
mobile citizens run for election, since both types of citizens cannot receive the same 
number of votes. Furthermore, if at least one region has no immobile resident among 
the candidates, a mobile citizen enters and wins the election.  QED 
Hence, the ban on discriminatory taxation at an individual level may fundamentally 
change the outcome of the policy stage. If discrimination is allowed, it is simply the 
largest (homogeneous) group of citizens that will win the election and decide on taxes 
and public good supply. Anyone who is not member of this dominating group will be 
totally exploited. If discriminatory taxation at the individual level (but not at the region-
al level) is forbidden (or simply impossible), the mobile citizen group has a strong 
advantage over immobile citizens at the policy stage. This holds true even if there are 
only very few mobile voters surrounded by a large number of immobile voters. Mobile 
citizens are not willing to discriminate against a particular region because doing so will 
hurt them. Thus, from the perspective of immobile citizens with no candidate in the 
race, when the contest is between a mobile citizen and an immobile resident of another 
region, the mobile citizen is the lesser of two evils. 
As a consequence, if the ban on discriminatory taxation itself is subject to major-
ity voting, it will most likely be approved. If  ∑ = < <
n
1 k k 1 L N L , the majority of society 
would opt for this ban, since a mobile candidate will win the election no matter what, 
but immobile citizens will benefit from the ban. If  1 L N < , the ban may still be ap-
proved, since mobile citizens and all immobile citizens except the largest group of 
immobile residents will benefit from the ban if the outcome of the election is a mobile-
citizen-led government. However, even if an immobile citizen from the largest group 
wins the presidency, all other citizens might benefit from the anti-discrimination rule if 
the efficiency loss caused by tax-rate differences across regions is not too large and if 
the immobile candidate does not completely exploit the other regions. 




Ii P P f , for all j, i, with j ≠ i, 
holds, mobile candidate will lose and immobile residents of the largest region will gain 
electoral power. An equilibrium where only a mobile candidate appears cannot exist, - 17 - 
since some immobile rival candidate would run for office and win the election. Fur-
thermore, in a symmetric setting, where L  :=  Ln = L1, the unique equilibrium at the 
policy stage is a n-candidate equilibrium with one immobile candidate from each region 
provided that L > N. Every smaller set of candidates would attract further candidates.  
6  Summary and discussion 
This paper analyzed inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using 
the citizen-candidate model, with a focus on conflicting interests between regions and 
between citizens of different mobility. First, policies were analyzed under an assump-
tion of nearly non-restricted discrimination. If there is (or can be) discrimination both 
with respect to the place of residence and with respect to degree of mobility, diversity of 
interests is high. It was shown that under the plurality rule and assuming sincere voting, 
the largest socioeconomic group of citizens will provide the winning candidate and then 
discriminate against all other groups. A second analysis was performed, this time in-
cluding the condition that discrimination with respect to degree of mobility is prohibited 
and the results revealed that mobile citizens might gain power in this situation. In fact, it 
becomes much more likely that the winning candidate is a mobile citizen even if the 
total number of mobile citizens is small compared with the number of immobile resi-
dents of each region. This is because mobile citizens are not interested in regional 
asymmetric distribution of the tax burden; as a consequence, interregional redistribution 
is reduced. 
  To obtain clear-cut results, the paper made use of several simplifications. First, 
local public goods offer opportunities to discriminate against groups and regions, par-
ticularly if preferences for local public goods differ across socioeconomic groups. 
Second, the paper assumes proportional taxation. If the law permits a regressive redi-
stribution system, immobile residents are less willing to vote for representatives of 
highly productive mobile citizens (since redistribution from immobile to mobile could 
be realized by a regressive tax system). Third, the degree of mobility is not a perfectly 
observable property. An immobile candidate may try to pass himself or herself off as a 
mobile citizen. However, given the intense media scrutiny of candidates in major elec-- 18 - 
tions, the truth as to a candidate’s mobility (or lack thereof) is almost certain to come 
out during the campaign. 
  Finally, although this paper’s perspective is a theoretical one, several of its 
propositions are empirically testable. Governors of states with a majority of immobile 
residents, and candidates from parties having a strong local attachment not present in 
other regions, should be comparatively unsuccessful in a presidential election, since 
they can be classified as “immobile” candidates. As far as identifying an “immobile” 
region goes, the following characteristics should prove helpful: labor force employment 
in agriculture, fishery, and mining, an only locally spoken language, and ethnic concen-
tration. 
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Appendix 
To simulate the policy choices under a ban on discrimination, Cobb-Douglas technolo-
gy,  ()
α − α =
1 L N L , N F , and log-utility of the public good,  G ln ) G ( v β = , is assumed. The 
benchmark parameters are α = 0.5, β = 0.l,  15 N = . Here, an asymmetric setting is 
analyzed:  15 L1 = ,  5 L2 = , and  10 L3 = . Results are shown for a mobile-citizen led 
government and a government led by an immobile resident of region 1. In figure 1 the 
indifference curves of the leaders are depicted (assuming that ρ is optimally chosen), 
where  1 N  is on the horizontal axis and  2 N  on the vertical axis. Table 1 summarizes the 
crucial variables. 
Figure 1: Indifference curves 
   
Mobile politician           Immobile politician from region 1 
Table 1: Policy choices 
  Mobile politician  Immobile politician from region 1 
ρ  0.61 0.52 
G 3.00  3.30 
1 N   7.50 13.64 
2 N   2.50 0.45 
N u   0.72 0.64 
1 I u   0.41 0.59 
2 I u   0.41 0.17 
3 I u   0.41 0.17 
 